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Uniqueness—Obama's Re-Election Chances are Uncertain—He Will Win But It Isn't a Lock
Newsmax, "Gallup Finds Mixed Signals on Obama Re-election," May 16th, 2012
(<http://www.newsmax.com/Politics/Gallup-Obama-re-election-poll/2012/05/16/id/439285>)

With an approval rating stuck below 50 percent and a sour national mood, President Barack **Obama's re-election bid faces an uncertain future.**

Gallup polls shows that Obama's job approval rating in the first week of May averaged just 47 percent and a May 3 through 6 Gallup poll found only 24 percent of Americans were satisfied with the way things are going.

"Comparing today's economic and political ratings with those from previous years when presidents sought re-election reveals that today's climate is more similar to years when incumbents lost than when they won." Gallup noted.

The 24 percent satisfaction rate is similar to the 20 percent found in May 1992 under President George H.W. Bush, who lost his re-election bid. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both posted satisfaction rates above 35 percent in the May before their successful re-election bids.

"The extent of Americans' concern about the economy — as evident in their top-of-mind mentions of it as the nation's 'most important problem' — is greater today than for any president seeking re-election since Jimmy Carter in 1980." Gallup found.

"The current 66 percent mentioning one or more economic concerns is substantially higher than it was in May 2004 or May 1996, and moderately higher than at the same point in 1992 and 1984. Americans' mentions of the economy did surge in August 1984 to 65 percent — comparable to where they are today — but fell to 51 percent by September."

Gallup found that the direction of its Economic Confidence Index — a summary of Americans' views of the economy and its direction — "for the remainder of 2012 could determine Obama's re-election."

However with a battle against Republican Mitt Romney looming, assessing Obama's chances of re-election based on his job approval rating is problematic.

All presidents since Lyndon Johnson who won re-election had job approval rates of 49 percent or more in May. All those who lost had approval ratings of 43 percent or lower. Obama, at 47 percent, does not neatly fit into either camp but is close to the younger Bush's 49 percent in 2004.

"President Obama is running for re-election with Americans feeling about as dissatisfied with the country and the economy as they were in 1992 when George H.W. Bush lost," Gallup concluded. "However, with a modest 47 percent job approval average in early May, his approval rating is nearly the same as in 2004 when George W. Bush won. **This makes Obama's re-election prospects quite uncertain, but supports the results of Gallup's trial heat tracking showing Obama and Romney essentially locked in a statistical tie.**"

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Link—Midterms Prove That Voters React to Transportation Infrastructure Spending By Voting Republican

Reuters, "New Congress to revisit Obama transport priorities," November 8th, 2010

(<http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/08/us-infrastructure-congress-idUSTRE6A749F20101108>)

(Reuters) - Republicans will scrutinize popular Obama administration transportation infrastructure initiatives when they assume control of the U.S. House of Representatives, possibly pulling back some funds dedicated to specific road and rail projects.

John Mica, who is expected to chair the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, told Reuters in a post-election interview that he would conduct a close review of how money was spent from the 2009 economic stimulus package approved by the Democratic-controlled Congress. He also plans to reevaluate grant programs that bypassed congressional review.

The new look at spending comes after voters last week questioned Obama infrastructure priorities in electing Republican governors who campaigned against what they considered unworkable transportation spending.

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Impacts—Obama's Second Term Allows Him To Ratify the CTBT—Ratification Will Dramatically Reduce Proliferation and Prevent Aspiring States From Nuclearizing as Well as Shutting Off Arms Races

Jenifer Mackby, secretary of the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the Group of Scientific Experts in Geneva, "NONPROLIFERATION VERIFICATION AND THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY," Fordham International Law Journal, 2011 (<http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2291&context=ilj>)

This was followed in April 2010 by a new Nuclear Posture Review, which is the first to refer to the elimination of nuclear weapons and which also states that " **ratification of the CTBT is central to leading other nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual disarmament.**"⁴ An unprecedented gathering of world leaders at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, in April 2010 was followed by the signing of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ("New START") by President Obama and Russian President Medvedev.⁵ Shortly thereafter, **states parties of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ("NPT") adopted a final document at the May 2010 Review Conference that called on all states to "refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty pending its entry into force, in particular with regard to the development of new types of nuclear weapons."**⁶ Beginning with the proposal by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954 to the UN General Assembly, numerous generations have chased the elusive goal of a treaty banning nuclear explosive testing. Experts believe that **a ban on nuclear explosions will curtail the capabilities of states parties to develop more advanced nuclear weapons and prevent an aspiring nuclear state from proving its capability.**⁷ It would thus **impede a nuclear arms race and is seen as a measure to strengthen the NPT,** which calls for nuclear disarmament in its Article VI, as will be discussed below.

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Proliferation Destabilizes International Relations and Spins Out Of Control—The Resulting Wildfire Proliferation Causes Nuclear First Strikes, Escalation and Extinction

Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, "Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions," Survival, 2002 (pgs. 87-88)

Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons. Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of establishing a reliable supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nuclear-armed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were [was] no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world's capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world's states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint. Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent's nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons.

Uniqueness—Obama Wins Now**Obama Will Win Now—Despite Close Poll Results Obama's Incumbency Puts Him Over**

UPI, "Poll: Most expect Obama to win re-election," May 15th, 2012

(http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2012/05/15/Poll-Most-expect-Obama-to-win-re-election/UPI-22271337113832/#ixzz1w8A6enOT)

PRINCETON, N.J., May 15 (UPI) -- U.S. voters overwhelmingly say they expect President Obama to win re-election, the latest Gallup poll indicated Tuesday.

The [Gallup/USA Today poll](#) found 56 percent of those queried said they expect Obama to win, compared to 36 percent who said they expect presumptive Republican nominee [Mitt Romney](#) to come out on top.

At the same time, Gallup's daily tracking poll indicated voters were evenly divided on their preferences, with 46 percent favoring Obama and 45 percent, Romney.

"It is unclear why Americans are more inclined to predict an Obama than a Romney victory when the two are essentially tied in Gallup's latest election polling. It may be that Americans recognize the advantages Obama has as the incumbent and that historically, presidents seeking re-election usually win," Gallup said.

Uniqueness—No Transportation Infrastructure Before the Election**No Transportation Infrastructure Passage Now—Republicans and Democrats Will Fight Over It**

Reuters.com, "House Republicans want \$260 billion for infrastructure," January 30th, 2012

(<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/31/us-usa-congress-infrastructure-idUSTRE80U03Z20120131>)

(Reuters) - House Republicans will propose legislation on Tuesday calling for \$260 billion in spending on transportation infrastructure for up to five years, an election-year proposal touted as a job creator in a tough economy.

Transportation Committee Chairman John Mica was due to formally introduce the measure and unveil details for funding road, bridge, and rail improvements at a news conference, his office said.

Additional elements could be tacked on by other committees in coming days, including a plan to authorize the Canada-to-Texas Keystone XL oil pipeline despite the refusal of President Barack Obama to advance the project.

While both Republicans and Democrats agree that Congress must lay out a new long-term blueprint for infrastructure improvements, finding the political common ground to do so in legislation has been difficult in a charged partisan climate and with elections looming in November.

Uniqueness/Brinks—Close Race Now**Obama is in the Lead Now, But the Race Remains Close**

New York Daily News, "Latino voters support President Obama for reelection over Mitt Romney: poll," May 24th, 2012 (<http://www.nydailynews.com/news/election-2012/latino-voters-support-president-obama-reelection-mitt-romney-poll-article-1.1084181#ixzz1w8E2L28C>)

Despite his apparent lead among Latinos, the president may have work ahead of him if he hopes to translate survey support into ballot box gains.

Sixty-eight percent of Latinos say they are highly interested in the upcoming election, 13% fewer than voters overall who express high interest in the contest.

Overall, Obama and Romney are locked in a tight race with less than six months to go before the November general election.

Though the president has an edge over his GOP rival in both the NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll (47% to 43%) and an [ABC News/Washington Post poll](#) (49% to 46%) released Tuesday, both show the candidates in a statistical tie.

Links—Transportation Infrastructure Spending Hurts Obama**Obama's Transportation Infrastructure Proposals Refuse to Engage the Question of Funding—
They are Politically Dangerous in an Election Climate Which Refuses to Increase Spending**

Governing.com, "Can America Fix Its Infrastructure by Ending Its Wars?" January 25th, 2012

(<http://www.governing.com/blogs/fedwatch/can-the-country-fix-its-infrastructure-by-ending-its-wars.html>)

Joshua Schank, head of the transportation policy think tank Eno Center for Transportation, said he liked what he heard from the president about the need for building infrastructure to help improve the country's economy. But for Schank, "the funding is where it all fell apart."

"Now, he's in campaign mode," says Schank, who worked as a transportation policy adviser to then-Sen.

Hillary Clinton during development of the last surface transportation authorization. "He's not going to say 'this is how I'm going to pay for transportation for the next six years.'"

During 2011, lawmakers in the Senate and House committees responsible for formulating transportation policy worked to figure out how exactly to pay for a new highway and transit bill. The crux of the issue is the declining balance of the Highway Trust Fund, which relies on gasoline taxes to help pay for roads and transit. It's funded primarily by a 18.4 cent-per-gallon tax which hasn't been increased since 1993. It's generating less money than it has in the past due to the increasing fuel efficiency of vehicles. Going forward, the fund is about 20 percent shy of covering baseline highway and transit spending. Many on the transportation committee have advocated for increasing the gas tax or switching to a different model, like replacing the gas tax with a per-mile tax. House Republicans are pursuing a plan to supplement the highway bill with royalties derived from energy production. Senate Democrats continue to explore other options.

But the president made no mention of the challenges facing the Highway Trust Fund, which will likely run out of money early next year, or explain how it can be bolstered. He also didn't make a case for any other another permanent and ongoing funding source for transportation infrastructure funds. "Anything would have better than saying 'war savings,'" Schank says. "It's just red meat to the base. It's not something that's constructive."

It's not the first time Obama has had lofty rhetoric calling for investment in transportation that fell short of a specific plan. His budget [last year](#) called for a six-year, \$556 billion surface transportation bill that was viewed by most transportation experts as wildly optimistic given Congress's emphasis on reduced spending and deficit reduction.

Links—Transportation Infrastructure Spending Hurts Obama**Spending on Transportation Infrastructure Hurts Obama—Voters See Spending But No Progress**

Capital New York, "When is Obama Going to Have His Eisenhower Moment.?" March 27th, 2012

(<http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/03/5524547/when-obama-going-have-his-eisenhower-moment>)

Ask a transportation expert who the last great transportation president was, and you're not bound to find much agreement. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who in the 1950s championed the creation of the Interstate System, is a common choice, though Jimmy Carter merits mention for deregulating the trucking industry and airline and air-freight transportation, and Ronald Reagan, for raising the gas tax and dedicating part of it to mass transit.

On the subject of the current president, there's more of a consensus. One point of agreement is that he has talked a great game, but has been unable to do much to deliver. Another is that he might be able to do more if he gets a second term, but that even then it would depend on whether the upcoming election produces a Congress that is, one way or another, less hostile to his agenda.

"Even Eisenhower didn't mention transportation as much as this guy," said Joshua Schank, a former transportation adviser to Hillary Clinton who is now president of the Eno Center for Transportation.

"It's hard not to be frustrated that he hasn't acted on it more," he added.

At the moment, it can safely be said that building support for increased transportation spending is not the president's top priority, as he heads into a general election with the economy just showing signs of recovery. Infrastructure funding—and what were once packaged as stimulus projects, generally—have taken a back seat to, say, [the price of gas](#) and, by extension, the conspicuously expanded drive for domestic energy resources.

The lesson that Obama and the administration seem to have taken from the times they have pushed hard for spending on big transportation-infrastructure projects is that they're a tougher sell than expected, or at least that voters don't necessarily see them as the economic generators they eventually become.

Links—Transportation Infrastructure Spending Hurts Obama**The Spending or Taxes Required for Transportation Infrastructure Spending are Politically Devastating**

Capital New York, "When is Obama Going to Have His Eisenhower Moment.?" March 27th, 2012

(<http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/03/5524547/when-obama-going-have-his-eisenhower-moment>)

The reforms that transportation boosters have in mind are, generally speaking, more profound: an ongoing commitment to paying for large capital projects and maintenance of existing infrastructure; sustainable sources of revenue to offset that cost; alterations to the system of incentives that drive commercial and residential growth, and to the metrics that measure the efficiency and cost of moving people around their regions and across the country.

"The federal tax code subsidizes some really bad development," says Andrew Goldberg, managing director of government relations at the American Institute of Architects, which [has advocated](#) tax-code reforms. "A lot of the funding goes toward sprawl, toward building where land is cheapest."

"I know this isn't sexy," said Schank, "but he could direct D.O.T. to start doing the research necessary to implement real performance measures and accountability for transportation."

In other words, the administration could lay out a precise vision for how it would like to see the money it controls spent, and support that vision accordingly.

The American Society of Engineers says there's a [\\$3 trillion backlog](#) in surface transportation spending. The United States spends [a mere 2.4 percent of its G.D.P.](#) on transportation and water infrastructure, compared to Europe's 5 percent and China's 9.

Many transportation experts also argue for a significantly higher tax on gas.

This is politically difficult, if not impossible, as illustrated by the way Republicans have latched onto currently high gas prices as an argument against Obama, and the president's high-profile response, cheerleading the expansion of domestic oil and gas exploration as a solution.

Links—GOP Hates Infrastructure Spending**Republicans Hate Federally Sponsored Infrastructure Improvements**

Huffington Post, "GOP Candidates' Transportation Infrastructure Talk Praises Tolls But Ignores Jobs," January 4th, 2012 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/04/gop-candidates-transportation-infrastructure-jobs_n_1184314.html)

President Barack Obama made improving transportation infrastructure a centerpiece of both his 2009 stimulus bill and 2011's American Jobs Act, which died in Congress late in the year. Upgrading the country's poorly maintained roads and bridges, the president argued, would have the dual benefit of improving business opportunities while putting people to work. Speaking in front of the functionally obsolete Brent Spence Bridge in Cincinnati in September, the president [said](#), "We used to have the best infrastructure in the world."

"How can we sit back and watch all these countries in Europe and Asia build newer airports and faster railroads and stronger bridges?" Obama asked in an address that sounded like a campaign speech to observers. "At a time when millions of unemployed construction workers could build them right here in America?"

Among the Republican candidates running for president, however, references to transportation infrastructure [have been few and far between](#). Infrastructure's [job-creating potential](#), so critical for Obama, seems not to register among the GOP candidates, who abhor deficit spending and argue they'll be able to grow the economy as a whole by cutting taxes.

"I listened to some of the debates, but I don't recall the word transportation at all," said Ken Orski, a transportation consultant and former Nixon administration official.

Obama "seems to view transportation as a social good and therefore to be supported irrespective of its economic basis, of its self-financing basis," Orski argued.

Republicans, by contrast, view transportation as either a local issue or "a sector that ought to stand on its own feet, in other words pay for itself, in other words through tolls or other fees," Orski said.

If there is one thing that GOP candidates Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich seem to agree on, it's those "user fees." If a road's worth building, the argument goes, people will be willing to pay for it themselves through tolls.

Links—GOP Fights Obama On Transportation Infrastructure**Republicans Will Fight Obama on Substantial Transportation Infrastructure Spending**

USA Today, "New report: Road congestion wastes 1.9 billion gallons of gas," March 25th, 2012

(<http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/story/2012-03-25/wasted-fuel-report/53776164/1>)

Traffic congestion costs drivers more than \$100 billion annually in wasted fuel and lost time, according to the report released Friday.

The report — released in support of [President Obama](#)'s plan to upgrade and expand America's transportation infrastructure in fiscal year 2013 — comes as Republican presidential candidates criticize Obama for high gasoline prices and his administration and the Senate wrestles with House Republicans over a new transportation bill.

The [White House](#) supports a two-year, \$109 billion transportation and infrastructure bill approved March 14 by the Senate. House Republicans are divided over a five-year, \$260 billion bill. The House votes Monday on a temporary extension to continue providing highway and transit aid to states as the spring construction season begins.

Links—Transportation Infrastructure Costs Political Capital**Transportation Infrastructure Requires Massive Political Capital Expenditure**

Capital New York, "When is Obama Going to Have His Eisenhower Moment.?" March 27th, 2012

(<http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/03/5524547/when-obama-going-have-his-eisenhower-moment>)

"The interstate system, most of it is already approaching half a century old," says Yaro. "It's at the end of its useful life. Big stretches need to be rebuilt and there's no money to rebuild them, much less create any new capacity in the system." The president, at least rhetorically, recognizes that. He's proposed a [half-trillion-dollar, six-year transportation plan](#). And he's suggested a [\\$50 billion infrastructure bank](#) that would leverage private funding.

As of now, they're still just proposals.

"So far he hasn't really put his political capital behind it because he has other priorities," said Schank.

In this year's [State of the Union](#), the president made a strong argument for infrastructure spending.

"During the Great Depression, America built the Hoover Dam and the Golden Gate Bridge," he said. "After World War II, we connected our States with a system of highways. Democratic and Republican administrations invested in great projects that benefited everybody, from the workers who built them to the businesses that still use them today."

"In the next few weeks, I will sign an executive order clearing away the red tape that slows down too many construction projects.

"But you need to fund these projects. Take the money we're no longer spending at war, use half of it to pay down our debt, and use the rest to do some nation-building right here at home."

The "you" in that sentence was Congress.

But the Republican-controlled House is looking to cut transportation spending, not increase it. It will be all the president can do to get them to agree to pass the Senate's version of this year's transportation-spending bill, which more or less extends the status quo.

"The White House hasn't recommended funding sources, and the Congress has been reluctant to propose new revenues," says Yaro, of the Regional Plan Association.

**Links—Transportation Infrastructure Spending Costs
Political Capital****Funding Transportation Infrastructure Projects By Fiat is Precisely the Type of Proposal That
Costs Political Capital**

Capital New York, "When is Obama Going to Have His Eisenhower Moment.?" March 27th, 2012

(<http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/03/5524547/when-obama-going-have-his-eisenhower-moment>)

"I'll tell you this, if he wins a second term, he's going to come into a second term with some domestic priorities," said

Schank. "Investing in transportation is not a bad way to invest his political capital."

In the transportation nerd's fantasy scenario, one in which funding was bountiful and politicians were programmed to spend it judiciously, the president would direct federal government to do things like rebuild the nation's highways, expand its rail and transit networks, and improve connections between the two. The country could subsidize freight rail, unclogging the highways. The government could fund passenger rail too, and do it where it's needed, like, say, in the Northeast corridor.

"The interconnection between highway and rail systems in many places could be done much better," said Paul Yarossi, chairman of the American Road and Transportation Builders Association. "I think we could improve our ability to move product to and from docks and piers, how we integrate our rail and truck traffic together could be done better. It's just a matter of taking a look at what our transportation system might look like 20 years from now and seeing if there's a better way of making the different modes of transportation work together."

Internal Links—Obama Key to CTBT

Obama's Re-Election Will Enable Him to Ratify the CTBT as Part of a Larger Disarmament Agenda

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr, president of the Center for Security Policy, "[Expect More Disarmament From Obama](http://www.newsmax.com/FrankGaffney/Disarmament-Obama-Nuclear-Russia/2012/03/27/id/433994)," Newsmax, March 27th, 2012 (<http://www.newsmax.com/FrankGaffney/Disarmament-Obama-Nuclear-Russia/2012/03/27/id/433994>)

Later this week, a new push will be made for a treaty that would lock our deterrent permanently into just such a death spiral. The National Academy of Sciences will release a study that is expected to deem the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verifiable and further underground testing unnecessary.

Much evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, proponents of the CTBT and advocates of "Global Zero" — the multimillion campaign to eliminate all nuclear weapons that can, at most, rid the world of ours (and perhaps those of other, Free World nations that honor their international commitments) — hope to use the Academy's analysis to prevail upon the U.S. Senate to reverse its previous rejection of this accord.

At the same time as the Obama administration is wreaking havoc on our nuclear deterrent, it is undermining the other insurance policy we need against catastrophic, potentially country-cratering attacks like those involving ballistic missile-delivered electromagnetic pulse strikes: effective national, or better yet global, missile defenses. Policy decisions and budget cuts are taking their toll on our anti-missile programs. So is the president's willingness to cede technology or vetoes to the Russians.

In the latter connection, Obama was overheard telling outgoing Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in Seoul on Monday: "On all these issues, but particularly missile defense, this can be solved but it's important for [Putin] to give me space . . . This is my last election. After my election, I have more flexibility."

Translation: If President Obama is re-elected, we should expect even more U.S. disarmament — whether or not anybody is following our lead. Shouldn't that grim prospect be a centerpiece of the campaign this year, and the American people offered a robust alternative come November?

Internal Links—Obama Key to CTBT**Ambitious Foreign Policy is On Hold Until After the Election—Obama's Victory is the Only Chance to Get CTBT**

Strobe Talbott, President of the Brookings Institution, "It's the Climate, Stupid!," May 25th, 2012

(<http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/05/25-americas-role-talbott>)

Eight and a half months before Election Day, 2012 is already a vivid reminder of how presidential campaigns often impede far-sighted U.S. foreign policy and harm the country's image and effectiveness abroad. Any American who travels widely is likely to hear complaints, commiseration, or stupefaction over the way people go about electing, reelecting, or firing their chief executive here. The most important function of American democracy is far from the most dignified and edifying. Foreign friends are aghast at how expensive campaigns are. Newspapers on every continent have played up estimates that it now costs upwards of \$1 billion to win—or, for that matter, to lose—the White House. They note how conducive electioneering is to the polarization of the body politic and the dumbing down of serious issues, and how difficult it is for other governments to get business done with the United States during a political season that seems to go on forever. Most people around the world hope that their country will not be mentioned in the campaign debates or in candidates' stump speeches—and for good reason: if a nation is singled out, it is likely to be a target of disdain or anger. Think of 2004, when Francophobia was all the rage, or the China-bashing that accompanies pretty much every election year. The only regular exceptions are Israel and Great Britain. Americans should be aware of the damage that the way they conduct the most consequential manifestation of their political life is doing to their standing as the inventor of modern democracy. Then there's the more immediate—and, one must hope, aberrational—extent to which U.S. diplomacy and international leadership have been hobbled by the extreme partisanship that began even before Barack Obama was inaugurated. The polarization of American politics and the resulting paralysis of national governance have been worse during the past three-plus years than at any time going back to the late nineteenth century. The scorched-earth, take-no-prisoners, make-no-compromises mood in Washington has kept the federal government from serving well its own citizens and the world as a whole in at least three fields.

The first is geoeconomics, which is increasingly a synonym for—or at least a key component of—geopolitics. The U.S. government's inability to address adequately, even rationally, its own fiscal crisis threatens the global recovery as well as the American one.

The second is in international security. The United States has, for the past thirteen years, been mired in the embarrassing, even shameful position of refusing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, thereby making itself the most conspicuous holdout in the consummation of a process that was sponsored by American statecraft since the 1950s. President Obama came into office determined to secure Senate approval of the treaty in his first term, but that hope was dashed in the politically bloody aftermath of the health care wars.

On both economic and security policy, the United States is suffering from an acute case of "2013itis": almost no matter what the issue, and no matter whom you ask about the prospects for progress, the answer is "We'll get to that next year."

Internal Links—Obama Key to CTBT

Obama's Re-Election Will be the Green-Light For Passage of CTBT, But it Can't Happen Without Him

Global Security Newswire, "Senate Decision Key to Future of Test Ban Treaty," July 18th, 2011

(<http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/senate-decision-key-to-future-of-test-ban-treaty/>)

Still, the Senate's ratification last year of the U.S.-Russian New START nuclear arms control pact is cause for optimism about the test ban's chances on Capitol Hill, Kimball said. Thirteen GOP senators voted in favor of the bilateral agreement. The two years it took Moscow and Washington to negotiate and approve New START "was relatively fast for a treaty," according to Kimball. He said the administration should take whatever time is needed to see the test ban passed.

"I would hope that the issue of the test ban treaty does not become a partisan political football because there is strong Republican support for the test ban treaty out there," Kimball said. "If the treaty is not seriously considered by the Senate until after 2012, that will be because it took that much time to sort through the issues and to develop enough support to go ahead with the final stages of the ratification effort."

That plan, though, would hinge on Obama's re-election. Should he be defeated next year, the pact would almost certainly remain frozen in place in Washington.

In arguing for ratification, the administration will be able to point to advancements since 1999, including the near-completion of the International Monitoring System for detecting nuclear blasts and supercomputing power used in modeling the workings of the weapons. Obama has also pledged \$85 billion over the next decade for modernizing the nuclear complex.

"It's not enough for the Obama administration to point to a really fast computer, there has to be a strategy" for persuading the Senate to endorse the treaty, Lewis said. "They did very well on New START, but I think this is going to be a little bit tougher."

Rumblings so far from the GOP side have not favored ratification.

Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) led Senate opposition to the treaty 12 years ago and has remained an outspoken opponent of CTBT ratification (see [GSN](#), March 29). The lawmaker, however, does not intend to run for re-election in 2012.

Internal Links—Obama Key to CTBT**Obama's Re-Election is the Necessary Step to Approving the CTBT and Revitalizing Global Arms Control**

Judy Dempsey, Foreign Correspondent, "Munich Calling: What has happened to Arms Control?" January 16th, 2012 (<http://www.securityconference.de/Top-News-Detail.55+M5467b3f7058.0.html>)

None of this is good news. CFE is about deepening trust and creating a viable verification regime. The longer the negotiations remain suspended, the greater the damage to that trust. Another treaty in limbo, and for more than a decade, is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty aimed at prohibiting all nuclear test explosions.

The CTBT has already been signed and ratified by 154 U.N. countries, including Russia, Japan, South Korea and all NATO countries. But before the treaty can enter into force, it needs ratification by 44 named states. Of these -- India, Pakistan, and North Korea have yet to sign the Treaty. A further six states - China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and the United States -- have signed but not ratified it.

Security experts say they are not optimistic that the U.S. will ratify it in 2012. It might happen during a second Obama administration, if the Democrats continue to control the Senate. Were it to happen, the Arms Control Association, a non-partisan organization, believes that the U.S. could pressure other countries to shelve their nuclear programs or at least engage more productively with the international community.

It is hard to prove that. But if the U.S., Russia and the Europeans, could join forces, it might make a big difference to reviving arms control.

Impacts—CTBT Solves Testing**CTBT Will Enable Detection and Prevention of Worldwide Nuclear Tests**

Kingston Reif, director of nuclear nonproliferation at the [Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation](http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/kingston-reif/the-case-the-ctbt-stronger-ever), "The case for the CTBT: Stronger than ever," April 9th, 2012 (<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/kingston-reif/the-case-the-ctbt-stronger-ever>)

Detection. The United States has gained a more sophisticated understanding of monitoring capabilities in the last 10 years: "The status of U.S. national monitoring and the International Monitoring System (IMS) has improved to levels better than predicted in 1999." Any state that might consider cheating on the treaty by testing a nuclear weapon would run a very high risk of detection. Approximately 80 percent of the stations planned as part of the International Monitoring System -- a global network of detection systems and technologies -- are already in place. Though less robust at the time, this same monitoring system detected the North Korean nuclear test explosions in 2006 and 2009.

The CTBT also provides for short-notice, on-site inspections that can be used to confirm violations detected by the verification system. According to the report, "Constraints placed on nuclear-explosion testing by the monitoring capabilities of the IMS and U.S. [National Technical Means] will reduce the likelihood of successful clandestine nuclear-explosion testing." And, perhaps more significant, the treaty's prohibition on testing buttressed by the threat of detection will "inhibit the development of new types of strategic nuclear weapons."

Impacts—Nuclear Testing Bad (Supernova)**Nuclear Testing Accelerates the Sun's Transition to Supernova, Creates the Possibility of Solar System Obliteration Within Years**

Daniel Shaddox, "Nova Trauma Therapy," ZKD MEDICAL CENTER LITERATURE, 1999,
(<http://business.gorge.net/zdkf/mcl-ntt.html>)

Unfortunately, at this time, the exact date of the Sun's eruption into a Nova cannot be predicted, scientifically! Moreover, the timing situation is in grave danger of rapid acceleration, do to the side-effects of advanced nuclear testings (ie D'Stridium events). So, while we do not know its exact timing, we know that it is SOON, and that every day brings us closer to it!

So, what are we saying here? Is it going to be 5, 10, 20, 50, or 100 years? Hopefully, around 100! But, with testing, we may find that the Nova is set off in next year's Sun cycle, with its standard eruptions continuing to expand into...

Which brings up another issue. Some Stars go straight into Super-Novas and explode! (If our sun were to do this, it would wipe out the whole solar system in a matter of minutes.) Others swell and slowly expand into super-giants, sometimes

Impacts—Nuclear Testing Bad (Volcano Death Star)**Continued Nuclear Testing Rapidly Enhances Global Volcanic Activity and Literally Destroys the Planet**

Dr. Tom Chalko, PhD, Head of Geophysics Division & Sci Research @ Mt Best, "Can a Neutron Bomb accelerate Global Volcanic Activity?" NU Journal of Discovery, March, 2003 (nujournal.net/neutron_bomb.pdf)

Consequences of using modern nuclear weapons can be far more serious than previously imagined. These consequences relate to the fact that most of the heat generated in the planetary interior is a result of nuclear decay.

Over the last few decades, all superpowers have been developing so-called "neutron bombs" [1]. These bombs are designed to emit intensive neutron radiation while creating relatively little local mechanical damage. Military seem very keen to use neutron bombs in combat, because lethal neutron radiation can penetrate even the largest and deepest bunkers. However, the military seem to ignore the fact that a neutron radiation is capable to reach significant depths in the planetary interior.

In the process of passing through the planet and losing its intensity, a neutron beam stimulates nuclei of radioactive isotopes inside the planet to disintegrate. Stimulated disintegration, in turn, produces more neutrons. This process causes not only an increase in radiation levels but also increased nuclear heat generation in the planetary interior, far greater than the energy of the bomb itself.

It typically takes many days or even weeks for this extra heat to conduct/convect to the surface of the planet and cause increased seismic/volcanic activity. Due to this variable and seemingly inconsistent delay, nuclear tests are not currently associated with seismic/volcanic activity, simply because it is believed that there is no theoretical basis for such an association. Perhaps you heard that after every major series of nuclear test there is always a period of increased seismic activity in some part of the world. This actually cannot be explained by direct energy from the explosion. The mechanism of neutron radiation accelerating decay of radioactive isotopes in the planetary interior – a process that generates more neutrons and heat, however, is a very realistic explanation of Observable Reality. The process of accelerating volcanic activity is nuclear in essence. Accelerated decay of radioactive isotopes already present in the planetary interior provides the necessary energy.

The TRUE danger of modern nuclear weaponry is that their neutron radiation is capable to induce global overheating of the planetary interior, global volcanic activity and, in extreme circumstances, may even cause the entire planet to be demolished. So far, nuclear tests on Earth were limited to a few per year. Can we really predict what will happen if the US army uses dozens of their Neutron Bombs to destroy all "suspected" and "potential" weapon sites in Iraq?

Impacts—CTBT Solves Asian Arms Race**CTBT Critical to Stop An Asian Arms Race**

Reuters, "Obama administration to push for test ban treaty," May 10th, 2011

(<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/10/us-nuclear-usa-testing-idUSTRE7496M020110510>)

(Reuters) - The Obama administration said on Tuesday it was preparing a push for approval of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, arguing that Washington no longer needs to conduct nuclear tests but needs to stop other countries from doing so.

Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher said a legally binding global ban on testing would help pressure states like [Iran](#) from engaging in illicit nuclear activities and discourage an arms race in Asia, where rivals India and Pakistan have conducted nuclear explosions.

She declined to give a precise time when President Barack Obama would seek the Senate vote on the treaty, which the chamber rejected in 1999 when Bill Clinton was president.

There is widespread international support for the test ban treaty, which has been ratified by more than 140 countries, but it cannot come into effect because some nuclear powers like the United States and [China](#) have not ratified it. Proponents say U.S. ratification could help get other countries with nuclear programs to sign on.

In the coming months, the administration would seek to educate the Senate and public on the treaty's merits, Tauscher said. When the Obama administration does seek a vote, "we intend to win that vote," Tauscher said in remarks to the Arms Control Association in Washington.

"Whatever it takes to make that argument, and how long it takes to make that argument, the president is committed to do that," she said.

Opponents of the treaty argued in 1999 that a permanent end to testing could erode the reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Some questioned whether cheaters on a test ban treaty could be detected.

OFFICIAL: TREATY ESPECIALLY HELPFUL IN ASIA

The United States has not conducted a nuclear test in nearly 20 years, Tauscher said, and no longer needs to do so, meaning that "we give up nothing by ratifying the CTBT."

Meanwhile, there have been advances in systems that can detect tests that may be conducted by countries hoping to develop nuclear weapons or advance their nuclear capabilities, she said.

"Nowhere would these (treaty) constraints be more relevant than in Asia, where you see states building up and modernizing their forces," Tauscher said. A global ban on testing "would help reduce the chances of a potential regional arms race," she said.

Impacts—CTBT Solves Prolif**US Ratification of the CTBT is Crucial to Halt Proliferation**

Damien J. LaVera, Office to the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Office, "The U.S. Senate Vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," Arms Control Today, October 2004, (http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/LookingBack_CTBT.asp)

The third issue during the Senate debate in 1999 was the treaty's effect on curbing nuclear proliferation. CTBT supporters warned that rejecting the CTBT would undercut long-standing U.S. and international nuclear nonproliferation objectives, but critics suggested that its importance to nonproliferation was exaggerated. They argued that it would not stem proliferation because states do not need to test weapons built from proven designs and that the treaty would not add a new nonproliferation norm or legal barrier to proliferation because it would ban the testing of weapons that states are prohibited under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) from possessing in the first place. In many respects, this is true: a state with a proven design for a Hiroshima-type nuclear weapon, for example, and enough fissile material to make one could build such a bomb without testing it, and the NPT does prohibit the non-nuclear-weapon states from possessing nuclear weapons. The CTBT is intended to fortify the nonproliferation regime, however, by placing an additional barrier in front of those states seeking advanced nuclear weapons. Without the treaty, the international community is forced to fight that battle without one of its most important weapons. In any case, although normative arguments such as these are difficult to prove or disprove, the past five years have shown that treaty supporters were correct on at least one key point: the decision not to ratify the treaty has undercut efforts to strengthen and expand the arms control treaty regime. The vote robbed the United States and the international community of the leverage needed to convince India and Pakistan to sign the test ban and halt the production of fissile material. Momentum toward strengthening the NPT regime, most notably by implementing the enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards protocol developed to strengthen NPT verification, has been undermined, and no additional multilateral arms control agreements have been concluded since the vote. The U.S. failure to ratify the CTBT is not solely to blame for these developments, as many would have occurred under the Bush administration regardless of the vote. Nevertheless, in retrospect, the failure to ratify the CTBT was the first step by the United States toward abrogating its leadership of the international arms control treaty regime. Without that leadership, these and other nonproliferation efforts have clearly stalled.

Impacts—CTBT Solves Prolif**CTBT Ratification is a Literal Pre-Requisite for Effective Non-Proliferation Efforts—They Will Be Impossible Without It**

Deepti Choubey, Deputy Director, Nonproliferation Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "A Chance for Nuclear Leadership," Washington Post, November 7th, 2007 (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/06/AR2007110601851.html>)

Whoever wins in 2008, the most important strategic foreign policy issue facing the next President and Congress will be how to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. For almost four decades the world has been protected by a global agreement -- the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) -- which worked to keep the number of nuclear weapon states small. That agreement, and the world order that relies on it, badly needs U.S. leadership. There are three reasons why American influence is needed. First, the nuclear "have-not" states, who signed away their right to develop nuclear weapons, don't believe that the "haves" are living up to their side of the deal to eventually dismantle their weapons. Second, Iran's continuing refusal to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations and legally binding UN Security Council resolutions undermines the effectiveness of a rule-based system for managing nuclear technology and threatens international peace and security. And third, as excitement over a nuclear energy renaissance grows, non-nuclear-weapon states in the developing world declare large ambitions to master the nuclear fuel cycle, a scenario the old rules didn't account for. But the regime can be saved. Last month marked the eighth anniversary of the Senate's failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The treaty bans all nuclear explosions in all places and provides an opportunity for nuclear weapons states -- China, France, Russia, the U.K. and U.S. -- to make good on their legal obligation to dismantle their nuclear weapons arsenals. Forty-four states need to sign and then ratify the Treaty for it to go into effect. Pakistan, North Korea and India are the only three states not to sign. An additional seven states -- the U.S., Iran, China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia and Israel -- have signed but not ratified. U.S. leadership, in the form of Senate ratification, would pressure other "hold out" states to follow suit. Opponents to the CTBT have three concerns: can cheaters be detected, can the U.S. maintain a credible nuclear deterrent without testing, and will the CTBT help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons? Political and technical progress over the last decade has reduced these concerns: The CTBT monitoring system detected last year's nuclear test in North Korea (twenty times smaller than the Hiroshima bomb). Government studies have confirmed that U.S. weapons will be reliable for 85 years -- twice their expected life span -- further diminishing the need to test ever again. And finally, the world's leading experts agree that U.S. ratification of the Treaty would pressure other states to clarify their nuclear policies to the rest of the world -- including Iran, China, Egypt, India and Israel. Without the CTBT, it is difficult to imagine non-nuclear weapon states agreeing to the tighter rules the U.S. seeks to reshape the nuclear fuel cycle and prevent the emergence of more nuclear weapon states.

Impacts—CTBT Solves Prolif**CTBT Ratification Enhances Other US Non-Proliferation Efforts and Maintains US Security**

Deepti Choubey, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The CTBT's Importance for U.S. National Security," CEIP, Q&A, October 14th, 2009 (<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23999>)

The treaty calling for a global ban on nuclear tests was rejected by the United States Senate ten years ago. Over 180 countries have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but nine countries still need to ratify the treaty in order for it to come into force. Deepti Choubey describes the treaty's importance and how it impacts U.S. national security. "If the United States is to credibly reclaim its leadership position in preventing the further spread and use of nuclear weapons, taking steps like ratifying the CTBT will start to create the conditions by which other non-nuclear-weapons states, particularly more skeptical members of the non-aligned movement, would be willing to consider additional nonproliferation obligations," explains Choubey. Ratifying the CTBT will provide greater leverage over states of concern and enhance international peace and security. "That is in the interest of the United States. And in that way disarmament is not altruism—disarmament by the United States is very key for our own security interests."

Impacts—Proliferation Bad (Extinction)**Nuclear Proliferation Ensures Civilization Ending Nuclear Conflict**

Stuart Taylor Jr., journalist, LEGAL TIMES, September 16, 2002, LN.

The truth is, no matter what we do about Iraq, if we don't stop proliferation another five or ten potentially unstable nations may go nuclear before long, making it ever more likely that one or more bombs will be set off on our soil by terrorists or terrorist governments. Even an airtight missile defense will be useless against a nuke hidden in a truck, a shipping container, or a boat.

Unless we get serious about stopping proliferation, we are headed for "a world filled with nuclear-weapons states where every crisis threatens to go nuclear," where "the survival of civilization truly is in question from day to day," and where "it would be impossible to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists, religious cults, and criminal organizations," So writes Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., a moderate Republican who served as a career arms-controller under six presidents and led the successful Clinton administration effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

Impacts—Proliferation Bad (Accidental War)**Proliferation Sets the Stage for Accidental Nuclear War**

Scott Sagan, Co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, A debate*, 1995 (Google Books)

Such optimistic views of the effects of nuclear proliferation have not escaped criticism, of course, and a number of scholars have argued that nuclear deterrence may not be stable in specific regional settings. What is missing in the debate so far, however, is an alternative theory of the consequences of nuclear proliferation; an alternative that is a broader conception of the effects of nuclear weapons proliferation on the likelihood of war. In this chapter I present such an alternative, rooted in organization theory, which leads to a far more pessimistic assessment of the future prospects for peace. There are two central arguments. First, I argue that professional military organizations—because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests—display organizational behaviors that are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war. Unlike the widespread psychological critique of rational deterrence theory—which maintains that some political leaders may lack the intelligence or emotional stability to make deterrence work—this organizational critique argues that military organizations, unless professionally managed through a checks and balances system of strong civilian control, are unlikely to fulfill the operational requirements for stable nuclear deterrence.

Accidental Nuclear Attacks Will Provoke Escalation, Kills Billions

PR NEWswire 1998 (“NEJM Study Warns of Increasing Risk of Accidental Nuclear Attack”, 4-29-98, SP)

An 'accidental' nuclear attack would create a public health disaster of an unprecedented scale, according to more than 70 articles and speeches on the subject, cited by the authors and written by leading nuclear war experts, public health officials, international peace organizations, and legislators. Furthermore, retired General Lee Butler, Commander from 1991-1994 of all U.S. Strategic Forces under former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, has warned that from his experience in many "war games" it is plausible that such an attack could provoke a nuclear counterattack that could trigger full-scale nuclear war with billions of casualties worldwide.

Impacts—Proliferation Bad (Extinction)**Proliferation Destabilizes International Relations and Spins Out Of Control—The Resulting Wildfire Proliferation Causes Nuclear First Strikes, Escalation and Extinction**

Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, "Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions," *Survival*, 2002 (pgs. 87-88)

Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons. Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of establishing a reliable supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nuclear-armed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were [was] no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world's capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world's states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint. Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent's nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons.

AT: Won't Pass Next Term Either**Obama is Already Laying the Groundwork for the CTBT in a Second Term—It Will Win Republican Support if He Wins**

Kingston Reif, director of nuclear nonproliferation at the [Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation](http://www.thebulletin.org), "The case for the CTBT: Stronger than ever," April 9th, 2012 (<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/kingston-reif/the-case-the-ctbt-stronger-ever>)

After the longer-than-anticipated effort to win Senate approval of New START, the administration postponed plans to seek a vote on the CTBT in its first term. Instead, the White House has begun a cautious campaign to engage with the Senate on the treaty in preparation for a possible Senate vote in Obama's second term (should he win reelection). A critical piece of this outreach has been to encourage senators to carefully examine the remarkable improvements in America's ability to maintain the arsenal (via the stockpile-stewardship program) and to detect nuclear testing. In order to assist senators, the administration commissioned both the NAS report and a classified National Intelligence Estimate on the US ability to verify compliance with the treaty.

For ratification to proceed, Republican senators will have to resist undoubtedly strong political pressure to rush to judgment and instead closely examine the technical advances that have been made over the past decade. In the words of George Shultz, former secretary of state under Ronald Reagan, "[Republicans] might have been right voting against [the CTBT] some years ago, but they would be right voting for it now, [based](#) on these new facts."

AT: Uniqueness Overwhelms the Link**Economic Momentum is Low Now, Obama Doesn't Have this Locked Up**

Bloomberg News, "Obama Re-Election Momentum Hits Snag In April Jobs Report," May 4th, 2012

(<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-04/obama-re-election-momentum-hits-snag-in-april-jobs-report.html>)

A slowdown in job growth in April cuts the economic momentum behind President [Barack Obama](#)'s re-election bid as he prepares to officially begin campaigning.

U.S. employers added 115,000 workers to payrolls in April, the smallest gain in six months. The [unemployment rate](#) dropped to 8.1 percent as fewer people sought work.

[Roger Altman](#), a deputy [Treasury secretary](#) in the Clinton administration and a senior economic adviser to 2004 Democratic presidential candidate [John Kerry](#), called the monthly jobs report "pretty disappointing."

"We need 200,000 to 250,000 jobs to really make this, or to illustrate that this is a healthy and strongish recovery," Altman, chairman and founder of Evercore Partners, said in an interview on Bloomberg Television. "We're nowhere near that."

Private payrolls crossed a boundary in April to positive territory during Obama's term, with a net gain of 35,000 since he took office in January 2009. Total payrolls remain lower than when Obama was inaugurated because there are 607,000 fewer federal, state and local government employees.

The jobs report was released a day before Obama formally opens his re-election campaign with political rallies in the swing states of Ohio and Virginia. Presumed Republican presidential nominee [Mitt Romney](#) has made the president's stewardship of the economy a point of attack and polls show voters are focused on jobs and growth.

'Very Disappointing'

Romney termed the Labor Department report "terrible and very disappointing," and called it evidence Obama's policies aren't working.

"This is way, way, way off from what should happen in a normal recovery," Romney said in an interview on the Fox News Channel. "We seem to be slowing down, not speeding up."

AT: Testing Good (Weapons Safety)**Testing is Irrelevant to Weapons Security—We Know More Now Than Ever Before and Are Adequately Investing in the Safety and Reliability of the Arsenal**

Kingston Reif, director of nuclear nonproliferation at the [Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation](http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/kingston-reif/the-case-the-ctbt-stronger-ever), "The case for the CTBT: Stronger than ever," April 9th, 2012 (<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/kingston-reif/the-case-the-ctbt-stronger-ever>)

Nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. "Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stewardship are in place," the report states, "the committee judges that the United States has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing." In fact, the authors go on to say that "[t]he technical capabilities for maintaining the U.S. stockpile absent nuclear-explosion testing are better now than anticipated by the 2002 Report." The United States knows more about maintaining its nuclear weapons today than ever before.

In addition to a stronger grasp of the technology, the National Nuclear Security Administration has received enormous funding increases in recent years specifically to ensure the long-term health of the stockpile in the absence of testing. For example, the fiscal year 2013 request of \$7.6 billion for the security administration's weapons activities account is an increase of \$1.2 billion over the fiscal 2010 level. As Senator Dianne Feinstein [noted](#) at an appropriations committee hearing last month, "I believe the fiscal year 2013 budget request provides more than sufficient funding to modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile." Between America's advanced understanding of technical measures and sufficient money to maintain those measures, testing nuclear weapons is plainly no longer necessary to ensure US security.

AT: Testing Good (Generic)

Testing is Irrelevant to the Nuclear Agenda—We Don't Need or Use it Now and Don't Plan To
Kingston Reif, director of nuclear nonproliferation at the [Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation](#), "The case for the CTBT: Stronger than ever," April 9th, 2012 (<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/kingston-reif/the-case-the-ctbt-stronger-ever>)

What's more, the United States has not conducted a nuclear test since September 1992 and has no plans to resume explosive testing. As Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz, former commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, recently [put it](#), "Absent a radical change in the international environment, the political barriers to a resumption of testing would be practically insurmountable." Given that testing is not on the political agenda and isn't necessary to the maintenance of the arsenal, that detection capabilities are at an all-time high, and that national security would be improved under the treaty, it's difficult to understand why the United States would not take advantage of the CTBT. After all, the United States has conducted 1,030 nuclear tests -- more than all other nations combined. The body of knowledge the United States has gleaned from this matchless testing history means that a permanent test ban would provide the nation with an enormous security advantage relative to other nuclear-armed states.

AT: US Ratification Alone Doesn't Help**US Ratification Would Drive the Treaty Forward and Ensure At Least Chinese Ratification—
This Alone Solves an Arms Race in Asia**

Kingston Reif, director of nuclear nonproliferation at the [Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation](http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/kingston-reif/the-case-the-ctbt-stronger-ever), "The case for the CTBT: Stronger than ever," April 9th, 2012 (<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/kingston-reif/the-case-the-ctbt-stronger-ever>)

As of March 2012, 157 countries have ratified the CTBT. However, the treaty will not enter into force until 44 states that have been deemed "nuclear capable" have also ratified it -- including China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United States. But a move forward by the United States would establish the leadership needed to bring other countries along. If nothing else, China has indicated that it will ratify if the United States does. This would further strengthen the global norm against nuclear testing and encourage other holdouts, such as India and Pakistan, to ratify, reducing the possibility of a dangerous arms race in South Asia.

AT: Won't Pass Next Term**Obama Pushing the Groundwork for CTBT Now—The Scenario is Dramatically Different than 1999 and He Can Get It Done**

Defense News, "Obama Administration Renews Case for Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," February 21st, 2012
(<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120221/DEFREG02/302210006/Obama-Administration-Renews-Case-Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty>)

Now, his administration is working hard to convince Congress and the American public why the case for ratifying the treaty has grown stronger since its defeat in 1999, Rose Gottemoeller, acting undersecretary of state for arms control, told reporters.

"A lot has changed since 1999, and people have not had a chance to really look at the CTBT and understand what it can accomplish for U.S. national security," Gottemoeller said.

One stumbling block in 1999 was the concern that it would be too difficult to verify whether countries were playing by the rules of the treaty.

"The International Monitoring System was barely getting off the ground back then," Gottemoeller said. "Now, the international monitoring system is over 80 percent complete in its deployment and we can see its effectiveness."

She cited its responsiveness to the accident last year at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan, where the system was able to detect radioactive particles in the atmosphere.

The Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program has also improved in capability since 1999, according to Gottemoeller.

The program was developed to test U.S. nuclear capabilities without relying on nuclear explosions. The United States has had a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing since 1992. The program relies on simulation and other methods to ensure U.S. nuclear weapons remain reliable as they age.

"It has come a long way and it is developing quite a bit of capability," Gottemoeller said.

She said she has been explaining these changes to members of Congress and their staff.

"I expect to be doing a lot more of that in 2012.

"We're not going to set a deadline for ratification; we want to make sure the time is right," she said. "Believe me, I was at the [Department of Energy] in 1999 and watched the treaty go down in flames. I don't want to see that happen again."

Gottemoeller said she was encouraged by the debate that surrounded ratification of the New START Treaty, which the Senate ratified in December 2010.

Congressional members were serious about learning the technical details, she said.

"I'm hoping that the same thing will happen with the CTBT and we won't have people rushing to judgment, because truly a lot has changed in this time period."

AT: US Does Most of the CTBT Now**Regardless, The Benefits of the CTBT Can't Be Garnered Until the Treaty is in Force—It Stabilizes Dangerous Nuclear Flashpoints and Reduces Tensions Worldwide**

Arms Control Today, "The Logic of the Test Ban Treaty," May 2009 (http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_5/focus)

Indeed, the CTBT remains an essential part of a commonsense strategy to reduce nuclear dangers. By banning the bang, the CTBT constrains the ability of nuclear-armed states to perfect new and more sophisticated warheads. For instance, without additional testing, China cannot perfect the technology to arm its missiles with multiple warheads. Further, the CTBT can help de-escalate regional nuclear tensions. Ratification by Egypt, Iran, and Israel would reduce nuclear weapons-related security concerns and bring those states further into the nonproliferation mainstream. The Indian-Pakistani rivalry could be eased by converting their unilateral test moratoria into a legally binding commitment to end nuclear testing.

In addition, national and international capabilities to detect and deter possible clandestine nuclear testing by other states will be significantly greater with the CTBT in force. U.S. ratification also is essential to spur action by the eight other states whose ratification is required for entry into force.

Unfortunately, the Senate declined to give its advice and consent to ratification when it briefly considered the treaty in October 1999. Many senators who voted "no" expressed concerns about the ability of the United States to maintain its arsenal in the absence of testing and to verify compliance with the treaty.

That was then, and this is now. There is neither the need nor the political support for renewed U.S. testing for any reason, and it is in the interest of national security to prevent testing by others. Even though the United States has already assumed most CTBT-related responsibilities, it cannot reap the full security benefits of the CTBT until the Senate approves the treaty by a two-thirds majority.

AT: CTBT Hurts Hegemony/Nuclear Superiority**Entry Into Force of the CTBT Ensures US Nuclear Superiority, Promotes a Massive Advantage in Force Structure, Especially Since We Won't Test Anyway**

Steven Pifer, director of the Brookings Arms Control Initiative and a senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe, "New Support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on Nuclear Explosions," Brookings Up Front, March 30th, 2012 (<http://www.brookings.edu/up-front/posts/2012/03/30-nuclear-pifer>)

There are two other reasons why CTBT's ratification is worth considering.

First, no one—not even the staunchest CTBT opponent—has advocated that the United States resume nuclear testing now. But would it even be possible politically? The last U.S. underground nuclear explosion took place in 1992 at the Nevada test site, 40 miles northwest of Las Vegas. A lot has changed in Nevada over the past 20 years. The population of Las Vegas numbers almost three times what it was then. The state's politicians fought tooth and nail to block a nuclear waste repository at the former test site. Does anyone think Nevada would welcome resumed nuclear weapons testing? And if not there, is there another state eager to host nuclear tests?

Second, the CTBT would lock in a huge U.S. advantage in knowing more about nuclear weapons and nuclear tests than anyone else. In the years between 1945 and 1992, the United States conducted some 1030 nuclear tests—as many as all other nuclear weapons states combined.

And U.S. scientists learned more from tests. Twenty-four years ago, when serving at the American embassy in Moscow, I accompanied a team of U.S. testing experts to the Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk. At one point, our Soviet hosts showed us a three-foot diameter hole dropping hundreds of feet into the earth, ready to receive a nuclear device for an upcoming test. One U.S. expert commented that "the Russians sure will be surprised when they come to Nevada ... we drill our vertical shafts ten feet in diameter." Why so large, when modern U.S. nuclear weapons are relatively compact? Because the larger diameter of the hole gave U.S. testers a much greater surface area on which to hang instruments to collect data from the blast in the instant before the instruments themselves were vaporized.

The CTBT would codify the current reality in the United States: no plausible need to resume testing and no political possibility that we could. Improved verification means very high confidence that someone else's test would be detected. And the CTBT would lock in an important U.S. nuclear advantage. This should not be a difficult question.

AT: CTBT Doesn't Prevent Weapons Development**Under the CTBT Threshold States Can Develop Only Primitive Weapons, US Superiority Overwhelms**

Jenifer Mackby, secretary of the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the Group of Scientific Experts in Geneva, "NONPROLIFERATION VERIFICATION AND THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY," Fordham International Law Journal, 2011 (<http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2291&context=ilj>)

While a state that wants to develop nuclear weapons might not need to conduct a test to build a simple bomb, testing would be required to build more complex weapons. A report by General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded that the CTBT would enhance US security because of the United States' conventional military superiority, extensive nuclear testing experience, and advantages in stockpile stewardship capability.¹⁰⁰ The report also pointed out that other states that conducted tests below the detection threshold could not advance their nuclear weapons capabilities, and above that threshold, the verification capabilities were better than the opponents thought.¹⁰¹

AT: US Ratification Alone Doesn't Solve

US Ratification is a Circuit Breaker to Allow For Implementation of the Treaty—China, India, Pakistan Will All Follow—Chinese Compliance Solves the Impacts Regardless of Total Acquiescence

Jenifer Mackby, secretary of the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the Group of Scientific Experts in Geneva, "NONPROLIFERATION VERIFICATION AND THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY," Fordham International Law Journal, 2011 (<http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2291&context=ilj>)

Some have asked whether the countries still needed to ratify the treaty for it to enter into force, such as North Korea and Iran, will ratify the treaty even if the United States ratifies. "U.S. ratification is a critically needed circuit-breaker: it would have an immediate impact on other holdout states, and add major new momentum to both disarmament and non-proliferation efforts." 39 This may seem overly optimistic; however, international norms impose a powerful influence on states." International instruments and pressures have helped prevent a number of countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Regarding the other holdouts referenced above, Indonesia had stated that it would ratify as soon as the United States becomes a state party; however, it announced at the May 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that it would proceed to ratify on its own.¹⁴ Indonesia signed the treaty the day it was opened for signature, and its six auxiliary seismic stations in the IMS are all certified. 42 It is widely believed that China will ratify the treaty soon after the United States. Like the other P5 countries, China signed the treaty the day it opened for signature, and the treaty has been awaiting ratification in the National People's Congress for ten years. 43 China was active in the negotiations in the CD and has participated in the work of the CTBT PrepCom, including on OSI.¹⁴⁴ A high level Chinese diplomat in Vienna said, "China fully cherishes the international norm that any nuclear test after the CTBT is a violation, including for those countries outside of the CTBT."¹⁴⁵ China has thirteen IMS facilities, most of which are in the operational or testing phase.¹⁴⁶ In 1954 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru became the first to call for a nuclear test ban.¹⁴⁷ India has supported the elimination of nuclear weapons for many years and participated dynamically in the negotiations in Geneva, serving as Friend of the Chair on verification and legal issues.¹⁴⁸ However, the treaty did not include India's call for a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament and did include India on the list of countries required to ratify for entry into force. India responded by withdrawing its four monitoring stations from the IMS and declaring that it would not approve the treaty in the CD.¹⁴⁹ Shortly thereafter, in 1998, India and Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests. 50 India has since observed a moratorium on testing, and this is considered a condition of the United States for cooperation on the civil nuclear agreement of 2006.¹⁵¹ In 1999 Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee told the United Nations General Assembly that India would "not stand in the way" of the treaty coming into force.⁵² Nevertheless, others are not so optimistic, in view of a strong public opinion attached to the nuclear capability. The four monitoring stations (primary and auxiliary seismic, radionuclide, and infrasound) that were to be located in India are currently listed as "to be determined" in the alphabetical spot where India would appear, 53 and many assume that they will revert to the list of IMS stations if and when India signs the treaty. Pakistan was also active in the negotiations and has attended a number of meetings of the PrepCom and three of the bi-annual Conferences on Facilitating Entry into Force of the Treaty (Article XIV Conferences) as observer. 15 4 Pakistan has supported the conclusion of a test-ban treaty for many years, and voted for the treaty at the United Nations in 1996, unlike India.⁵⁵ It has also observed a moratorium on nuclear testing since its tests in 1998. It was thought that Pakistan would sign the treaty in tandem with India; however, Pakistan has recently claimed that the US-India nuclear deal has affected the imbalance in their capabilities and that it will act according to its own security interests.¹⁵⁶ Pakistan has a primary seismic and an infrasound station that are still in the planning stage.⁵⁷ Israel also participated actively in the negotiations in the CD. As an observer it was not permitted to break consensus; however, it contributed papers and proposed language that were reflected in the treaty. It was especially interested in the provisions for on-site inspections, being concerned about the non-abusive nature of the OSI regime, equal status in the Executive Council (which will make the decisions about OSI), and adherence to the treaty by other Middle Eastern states. As the Executive Council is composed of regional blocs, Israel is concerned that it will never be given a seat in the group encompassing the Middle East and South Asia. Although many do not think that this will prevent Israel from ratifying, Israel is unlikely to let its rights be compromised. 58 Israel continues to participate in the deliberations in the PrepCom, in particular on the OSI operational manual, training, and exercises. 59 It has two certified auxiliary seismic stations and a radionuclide laboratory on the IMS list.¹⁶⁰

AT: Moratorium Solves in the Status Quo**Moratorium Is Insufficient to Establish International Norms—Entering into Force is Crucial to Success**

Jenifer Mackby, secretary of the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the Group of Scientific Experts in Geneva, "NONPROLIFERATION VERIFICATION AND THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY," Fordham International Law Journal, 2011 (<http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2291&context=ilj>)

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires states parties to a treaty to refrain from actions that would "defeat the object and purpose" of the treaty.¹⁸ Thus far CTBT member states have not tested, even though the treaty has not entered into force. Nevertheless, entry into force would constitute a legally binding norm, while a moratorium constitutes an indeterminate status that could more easily be broken. Furthermore, not all countries have subscribed to a moratorium. Academic and research experts have occasionally espoused theories about the possibility of provisional application of the CTBT as a last resort.¹⁸² If the international community is blocked by a small number of intransigent states, it has been suggested that rather than wait for an indefinite period of time, the states parties could agree among themselves that the treaty has entered into force for them.¹⁸³ This would present many cumbersome legal, financial, and logistical questions relating to ownership of the stations, acquiring data from states not party to the treaty, recalculating the dues for each country, and other complex matters. Thus most experts have opposed the provisional entry into force, believing that it would provide a screen behind which nonparties could hide and delay the full entry into force indefinitely.⁸⁴ The idea was considered during the negotiations but has not been raised in the meetings of the PrepCom.

AT: Uniqueness Overwhelms the Link

Obama's Campaign Has Lost its Magic—There is No Personality, His Win isn't Assured

San Francisco Chronicle, "Obama's re-election campaign - the thrill is gone," May 27th, 2012

(<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2012/05/26/BA7Q1ON41I.DTL>)

The president's trip to the Bay Area last week made it painfully clear that the Barack [Obama](#) re-election campaign has lost its mojo.

There was no life, no personality, no memorable line or moment and no real enthusiasm in the entire fundraising foray. In short, there was no buzz.

It was like a summer rerun of a show that wasn't very interesting to begin with.

Worse yet, Obama sounded like he was playing catch-up to Mitt Romney. I can't think of anything that should have him in that role, but he's acting like the underdog.

Obama was more than a candidate last time out. He was a popular and cultural phenomenon. A rock star. But the trouble with rock stars is that they drop like a rock once fans conclude they are "over."

The trick in politics is not to be a one-hit wonder, but to be more like the Grateful Dead. Jerry and the boys were never what you'd call stars, but their Deadheads were legion and good days or bad, they always turned out in record numbers.

AT: Link Turns

Micro Level Fights Like the Aff Won't Do the Trick—Infrastructure Improvements Won't Generate Votes for Obama

The Atlantic, "Obama Needs to Articulate a Second-Term Agenda," May 25th, 2012

(<http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/obama-needs-to-articulate-a-second-term-agenda/257709/>)

While reveling in these fights, the president has not done nearly as much to explain what he would do in a second term, particularly to accelerate the still-sluggish economic recovery. Unless he fills in that picture more effectively, these wedge issues might not hold his key supporters, much less prevent further erosion among the groups, such as blue-collar and older whites, who resisted him even in 2008. Put simply, Obama may not win another term unless he provides Americans a better idea of what he would do with it.

He has set some priorities. Last September, he issued a series of near-term job-creation proposals headlined by a public-private bank to increase investment in infrastructure; grants to states to prevent layoffs of teachers and other public employees; and a payroll-tax cut. In his State of the Union address, Obama added a grab bag of tax breaks for companies that manufacture in the U.S.; a new community-college-based job-training initiative; the "Buffet Rule" to set a minimum 30 percent tax for millionaires; and a plan to ease home refinancing. He consistently calls for raising income taxes on the rich. Many of these ideas might be worthwhile. But even in combination, it's difficult to imagine them seizing the imagination or soothing the anxieties of economically strained voters. "There's no big economic theme," says Douglas Holtz-Eakin, president of the conservative American Action Forum. "He is unwilling to lay out an agenda ... and, as a result, he's constantly picking these micro-fights aimed at chosen constituencies."

AT: Non-Ux: Obama Taking Action Now**No One is Attempting Anything Now, Obama Will Play it Safe With No Major Initiatives Until the Election**

Fox News, "Obama, Romney try to play it safe in 2012 gamble," May 26th, 2012

(<http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/05/26/obama-romney-try-to-play-it-safe-in-2012-gamble/#ixzz1w8CVq9jR>)

In the risky business of running for president, Barack Obama and Mitt Romney are largely playing it safe.

For all the small daily dramas of the 2012 campaign, there's a risk-averse dynamic playing out: Neither candidate has been making bold new policy proposals or displaying a free-wheeling personal style. So far, at least.

Part of that is just who they are: Obama always has been known for his cool demeanor, and Romney has discipline built into his corporate pedigree.

Neither of them has the swagger of former President George W. Bush, the renegade streak of 2008 GOP nominee John McCain or the rascalion's grin of former President Bill Clinton.

But Obama and Romney are men who know how to gamble: Obama decided to run for president after just two years in the Senate, launched an ambitious health care overhaul effort while the economy was still on shaky ground, and gave the "go" order on the Osama bin Laden raid. Romney entered politics after a career in private equity, where risk is part of the job description.

Despite their backgrounds, their caution as candidates extends well beyond personal style.

AT: Non-Ux: Transportation Infrastructure Spending Now**Infrastructure Spending is a Miniscule Part of the Pre-Election Situation—Plan is the Only Chance it is Elevated to the Level of a Decisive Issue**

Better Cities and Towns, "War's end could help fund US infrastructure," January 25th, 2012

(<http://bettercities.net/article/wars-end-could-help-fund-us-infrastructure-15846>)

The fact is, transportation and other infrastructure projects occupied only a small part of Obama's speech. On his [Transport Politic](#) blog, Yonah Freemark said "it was clear from the President's State of the Union address last night that 2012 will be a year of diminished expectations in the face of a general election and a tough Congressional opposition."

The speech "failed to propose dramatic reforms to encourage new spending on transportation projects, in contrast to previous years," Freemark noted. "While the Administration has in some ways radically reformed the way Washington goes about selecting capital improvements, bringing a new emphasis on livability and underdeveloped modes like high-speed rail, there was little indication in the speech of an effort to expand such policy choices."

The current transportation authorization [expires on March 31st](#), Freemark emphasized. "There is so far no long-term solution to the continued inability of fuel tax revenues to cover the growing national need for upgraded or expanded mobility infrastructure."

The State of the Union focused much more heavily on prospects for improvement in the economy. Obama clearly expects that the state of the economy will be uppermost in voters' minds in this presidential election year. Though transportation and infrastructure spending can influence the economy, such spending seems to have been relegated to a lower position in the administration's priorities.

Aff—Non-Ux: Obama Loses Now**Obama is Likely to Lose Now—Huge Uphill Battle With Little Reason to Prevail Over Republican Advantage**

Breitbart.com, "Obama's Very Tough Road to Re-Election," May 27th, 2012 (<http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2012/05/27/obamas-very-tough-road-to-reelection>)

Incumbent Presidents enter a reelection campaign with a number of distinct advantages. They command a bully pulpit, able to make news and usually dictate the issues the public is discussing. They can use the levers of power to direct federal spending and initiatives to certain parts of the country. They can generally attract far more campaign donors, giving them the ability to out-spend their opponent. And, more importantly, they've already built the coalitions and alliances necessary for victory. If they are Democrats, they have the added bonus of a compliant media who will deflect criticism and cast negative attention on their opponent. And yet, Obama is very likely to lose in November.

This weekend, the Associated Press [published](#) a fairly good analysis of the state of the campaign. Including "solid" and "leaning" states, Obama had 247 electoral votes to Mitt Romney's 206. The race to get to the 270 votes needed to win would come down to seven states, according to the AP analysis; Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio and Virginia.

As the campaign develops, there will inevitably be other states thought to be "in play", but, assuming both camps run strong campaigns, it is very likely that these states will decide the election. The advantage for Romney is that he simply needs these states to revert to their historical pattern to prevail. Obama needs to, yet again, defy history. The challenge for Obama is that he is no longer the challenger with a simplistic message of "change", but rather an incumbent saddled with a weak economy and unpopular policies.

Aff—Non-Ux: Obama Loses Now**Romney Leads Now—Most Important Factors Demonstrate Obama Can't Generate the Necessary Momentum**

Baltimore Sun, "Obama's odds are nowhere close to 50-50," May 15th, 2012

(<http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/readersrespond/bs-ed-obama-reelection-letter-20120515.0.7246744.story>)

Democratic pollster Peter D. Hart's partisan assessment that President [Barack Obama](#)'s reelection chances are "no better than" 50-50 appears excessively optimistic ("2012 election a 50-50 proposition for Obama, top pollster says," May 11). The latest report from Scott Rasmussen, who indisputably is the nation's actual top pollster, has it 50-42, with [Mitt Romney](#) over Mr. Obama.

Unlike most of his counterparts, Mr. Rasmussen polls only the most committed — or "likely" — voters.

Mr. Hart based his assessment in part on subjective factors such as focus-group discussions and his personal conversations with "professional pols."

Despite his less scientific methodology, Mr. Hart was forced to conclude that voter "enthusiasm and commitment" favor Mr. Romney, that Mr. Obama's 2008 supporters "seem so much less engaged and enthusiastic" this year, and that Mr. Romney leads with respect to the all-important issue of improving the economy.

Aff—Link Turn**Voters Want Something to Get Done—Major Transportation Infrastructure Will Help Obama**

Associated Press, "[Highway bill enters legislative homestretch](http://www.salon.com/2012/05/01/highway_bill_enters_legislative_homestretch/)," May 1st, 2012

(http://www.salon.com/2012/05/01/highway_bill_enters_legislative_homestretch/)

It has taken Congress years to get this far. Work on a transportation overhaul began before the last long-term transportation bill expired in 2009. The Senate finally passed a \$109 billion bill with broad bipartisan support in March. The bill would give states more flexibility in how they spend federal money, step up the pace of road construction by shortening environmental reviews and impose a wide array of new safety regulations.

House Republicans, after failing to corral enough votes to pass their own plan, recently passed a placeholder bill that allows them to begin negotiations with the Senate. That bill included the Keystone provision, as well as provisions limiting the public's ability to challenge transportation projects on environmental grounds and taking away the Environmental Protection Agency's power to regulate toxic coal ash.

"I feel like people are worn out on this issue and would like to get something done," said Jeff Shoaf, a lobbyist with the Associated General Contractors of America, a trade association for the construction industry. "I think the prospects are good."

Aff—Link Turn**Obama Needs To Present Bold Infrastructure Initiatives to Win in 2012, Weak Compromises With Republicans Will Fail**

[Jack Kinstlinger](#), Chairman Emeritus, KCI Technologies, Inc., "Bold, Ambitious Plan Needed," National Journal, September 6th, 2011 (<http://transportation.nationaljournal.com/2011/09/obamas-infrastructure-plan-par.php>)

It is high time that the President comes out with a bold and ambitious plan to jump start the economy and increase job growth with emphasis on infrastructure construction. Our deteriorating infrastructure, no longer able to compete globally, and the dire employment situation in the construction industry demands nothing less.

The President must cease proposing minimal solutions in a futile effort to enlist Republican support. No realistic plan proposed by him will ever receive serious Republican consideration. Now is the time for the President to stake an ambitious position and let the electorate decide in 2012 whether it wants this nation to prosper or wither in an obsession with the deficit.

Aff—Link Turn**Obama Has Already Invested Capital in Reforming Transportation Infrastructure, He Needs to Prove He Can Get Something Done**

Associated Press, "[Highway bill enters legislative homestretch](http://www.salon.com/2012/05/01/highway_bill_enters_legislative_homestretch/)," May 1st, 2012

(http://www.salon.com/2012/05/01/highway_bill_enters_legislative_homestretch/)

The president painted a bleak picture of America's infrastructure in a speech Monday to union workers in the construction industry, saying U.S. highways are clogged, railroads are no longer the fastest in the world and airports are congested. A transportation construction bill would boost employment and the economy, but "the House Republicans are refusing to pass a bipartisan bill that could guarantee work for millions of construction workers," Obama said, referring to the Senate bill. "Instead of making the investments we need to get ahead, they're willing to let us all fall further behind," he said. The transportation bill "is incredibly important to the president," said Ed Wytkind, president of the transportation trades department of the AFL-CIO.

Aff—CTBT Bad (Prolif)**There is Only a Risk of the Turn—These States are Currently Governed by the NPT, Only a Chance that Diminished Security Encourages Further Prolif**

Kathleen C. Bailey, National Institute for Public Policy and Dr. Robert B. Barker, national security consultant and former Assistance Defense Secretary for Atomic Energy, "Why the United States Should Unsign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Resume Nuclear Testing," *COMPARATIVE STRATEGY* v. 22 n. 2, 2003, (pp. 136)

Nations can develop simple fission-type devices without nuclear testing. Additionally, most states are already obligated under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to neither acquire nor test nuclear weapons. The add-on of another arms control agreement therefore contributes little or nothing. CTBT proponents nevertheless claim that the treaty will reduce the incentive for other nations to acquire or improve nuclear weapons and will thus strengthen the nonproliferation regime. This conclusion is inconsistent with reality. Nations pursue weapons capabilities when they see it in their national interests to do so, regardless of arms control treaties. Nations are motivated primarily by their regional interests. Numerous examples speak to this truth: North Korea's violation of and withdrawal from the NPT, Iraq's violation of the NPT, and Iraq's violations of the biological and chemical bans. CTBT proponents have also suggested that the treaty would help prevent other nations from making the jump from fission devices to thermonuclear. This is highly debatable. "There are only three nations in this category—Israel, India, and Pakistan. It is unclear that these nations want or need thermonuclear devices, but if they do perceive such weapons as vital to their national security, a test ban will not stop them. They could refuse to join the treaty, could violate it clandestinely, or could abrogate it to test."¹⁶ Some experts have expressed concern that nations that have benefited from the nuclear umbrella of the United States might be encouraged to seek their own nuclear weapons if U.S. nuclear capabilities are seen as deteriorating as a result of a CTBT.

Aff—CTBT Bad (Asteroids)

Testing Will Be Crucial to Develop Weapons that Stop an Extinction Level Asteroid Strike San Francisco Examiner, "Nuclear missiles could Save the World," May 19th, 1995 (Lexis)

WHAM!: What's that in the sky? It's a bird, it's a plane, it's . . . it's a falling asteroid that will kill us all! A mountainous rock, hurtling at many miles per second, that will slam into Earth and vaporize part of the planet's crust, baking us like lobsters! Yes, it sounds like a tale told by a grocery-store tabloid. But it's taken seriously by scientists from two nuclear weapons laboratories, one in Northern California, the other in Russia. Now that the Cold War is over, they're looking for new ways to ply their trade. One way, it appears, is by using nuclear weapons to deflect incoming asteroids. Last month, a source told me about attending an arms-control meeting last November in Moscow, where one speaker made a startling announcement. The speaker, a Russian scientist, Valentin M. Danov of the biggest Russian nuke lab, Arzamas-16, described joint research on asteroid deflection by researchers from Russia and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Then Danov showed slides of paintings depicting how nuclear bombs could deflect asteroids. The slides were designed by Livermore and bear its logo. Text on the slides (I obtained copies) appears in both English and Russian. "If we don't stop the cosmic bombardment, IT WILL EVENTUALLY STOP US," declares one of Danov's slides. (Italics and upper case in original.) These folks used to plot each other's annihilation; now they collaborate in finding ways to shoot at asteroids. The slides show nuclear-tipped rockets zipping toward asteroids, and state: "Active defenses of ALL TYPES are readily feasible against 0.1 -kilometer-diameter (328 feet) threat objects." Bigger objects would be harder, but not impossible, to stop. The slides depict three basic types of anti-asteroid systems: "deflection-class" and "dispersion-class" (which would deflect or fragment the asteroid, respectively) and "vaporization-class" (which would vaporize the whole thing). In theory, a "deflection-class" blast would force an asteroid into a slightly different course, causing it to miss Earth. Sounds simple, right? In reality, asteroid-deflecting would be pretty darned complicated, judging by the slides. One picture shows Russia's huge Energiya rocket soaring skyward, carrying an anti-asteroid weapon that is laboriously named "Nuclear Explosive Interdiction Machinery" (NEIM, one presumes). Hundreds of feet above the asteroid, NEIM would drop a "string" of about 10 nuclear explosives, each equal to about 30 million tons of TNT. (The Hiroshima bomb released about 20,000 tons.) The blast would fry one side of the asteroid until it partly evaporated and ejected gases. The high-speed degassing would give the asteroid a "kick," deflecting it from its doomsday trajectory toward Earth. Another slide shows how NEIM could bore inside the asteroid, then detonate within, like a celestial dum-dum bullet. As Bart Simpson would say: Cool! The scariest asteroids are the biggest ones, larger than 10 kilometers (about six miles). The slides dub these superkiller asteroids "Great Extinctors," presumably because they would trigger a mass extinction, akin to the one that allegedly zapped Barney and his friends 65 million years ago. Great Extinctors "challenge contemporary human technology," the slides say; "fortunately, they are quite rare." Are anti-asteroid researchers an isolated band of paranoiacs? Apparently not: Next week, Livermore will hold a "Planetary Defense Workshop" to explore ways to protect Earth from these falling mountains. Scheduled attendees include lab director C. Bruce Tarter and ex-Livermore chief John Nuckolls, plus scientists from Russia and Beijing. The workshop's stated goal is to discuss "technical means potentially available in the next quarter-century to defend the biosphere from damage due to impact of large-scale (0.03-10 kilometer diameter) asteroids and comets." A word of advice to the weaponeers: Before trying to deflect any asteroids, you'd better check with your lawyers. The use of nuclear weapons in space is explicitly banned by the Outer Space Treaty of the late 1960s. And the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, for which U.S. negotiators have vowed to win international consent by late 1997, would ban all nuclear explosions, period.

Aff—CTBT Bad (Fusion Weapons)

Fusion Weapons aren't Covered by the CTBT—Their Development By Adversaries Would Result in US Having to Destroy the World To Respond

Sam Cohen, inventor of neutron bomb, "The Fatal Time Bomb," Insight on the News, November 22nd, 2009 (Lexis)

SUMMARY: The Senate recently rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but U.S. law forbids the research and development of third-generation, pure-fusion battlefield nuclear weapons. TEXT: The U.S. Senate was coned in rejecting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or CTBT. but it rejected it for all the wrong reasons. The real drawback has little to do with old, almost shopworn arguments over warhead reliability, safety, foreign-country attitudes, the U.S. leadership image and what have you No. the unacknowledged time bomb in the CTBT is that it would have perpetuated the hidden flaw in its ancestor, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, ratified more than 30 years ago. The flaw is that the arms-control framework does not recognise that there are three, not two, categories of nuclear weapons that have been developed, each with its own singular characteristics. And the third category is not covered. The first category comprises nuclear weapons for strategic application, which in the U.S. stockpile are the multi-hundred-kiloton warheads in our land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. These weapons are based on combined interactions of fission-fusion-fission, and it is the final "dirty" fission reaction that creates their enormous power. Their primary purpose is to destroy urban-industrial areas and the millions of inhabitants therein. Years back, we entertained dreams of fighting a defensive, "counterforce" strategic nuclear war with an adversary such as the Soviet Union. However, there were technical, intelligence and sociopolitical problems. What if a thermonuclear war went on for weeks, even months? Would the American people tolerate the destruction and devastation caused by such a war, while the warriors went at it in search of a victory that never was defined? For our military planners, the idea of a counterforce war became more and more of a fantasy, a scenario which never would be acted out. And so we were left where we were at the beginning: with Hiroshima and Nagasaki - and the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, as it was aptly named. The second category is tactical, involving warheads with a fission yield in the low-kiloton range. These originally were conceived for strictly battlefield use, intended primarily to kill the enemy's soldiers, not the civilian population. One example of a highly discriminate battlefield warhead is t-c neutron bomb which I, as the inventor, advocated as a humane alternative (if any weapons can be considered humane). As a result of my advocacy, I was awarded a papal peace medal 20 years ago in recognition of the fact that discriminate weapons conform to Christian "Just war principles. The third category is an emerging class of "third generation" warheads which are devoid of fissionable materials and whose use will not cause the dreaded radioactive fallout that can result from the use of the first two categories. These warheads are of the so-called "pure fusion" type using the heavy isotopes of hydrogen-deuterium and tritium. Being radioactive, tritium is not found in nature and, like plutonium, must be produced in nuclear reactors. But such warheads use only very small amounts of tritium - on the order of a gram - and thus can be very cheap in terms of nuclear cost, especially when produced in large quantities. These third-generation warheads will have extremely low yields, with a nominal yield being on the order of 10 tons TNT equivalent. At this yield level, clandestine testing cannot be detected and verified by the monitoring system of the CTBT. But from a military standpoint, they can be used far more effectively than any conventional (nonnuclear) armament and are extremely effective for a number of applications. Perhaps the most important application would be on the battlefield as miniature neutron bombs. But they also could be used as neutron warheads on antiballistic missiles and with a higher efficiency than any nonnuclear warhead thus far proposed. From a military standpoint this use alone would more than warrant their production and deployment. However - and this is the most worrisome - the small size and light weight of pure-fusion warheads would make them smaller and lighter than the smallest and lightest fission warheads developed to date. Used as mini neutron bombs they could become the ultimate terrorist weapon. A device roughly the size of a baseball could kill all persons within a circle of a few hundred yards. To be more specific, one such device, detonated in Lafayette Park across from the White House, could do away with a president sitting in the Oval Office and perhaps the bulk of the White House staff. However, the terms of the CTBT effectively overlook the possibility of anyone developing pure-fusion weapons. And since we can't detect whether any other country is testing and building such weapons, the United States would be at risk if we depended on the CTBT for our security. When the Non-Proliferation Treaty was being negotiated more than 30 years ago, U.S. nuclear-weapons laboratories were actively engaged in pure-fusion research. The researchers decided that pure fusion, while technically feasible, could not be made to work in the real world - so the project was dropped. The research seemed to be at a dead end. But that was a bad and potentially dangerous decision. History has shown that, sooner or later, seemingly insurmountable obstacles to scientific progress are likely to be overcome as new technologies for research emerge. The U.S. political judgment was that the Non-Proliferation Treaty safely could concern itself only with weapons based on fissionable materials - uranium and plutonium. Prohibitions against pure-fusion weapons were left out of the treaty for the simple reason that we thought such weapons couldn't exist. Today, thanks to the Russians who have been intensively pursuing research into pure-fusion devices for perhaps a decade or more, these devices appear to have become a reality. There is a significant body of compelling evidence to back up this possibility, including official statements from high-ranking Russian officials in their nuclear-weapons establishment. Viktor Mikailov, the Russian minister of atomic energy, says that these devices "realistically can appear in the next century." And Col. Gen. Yevgeny Maslin, chief of the Russian federation of defense, main directorate, says that "third-generation weapons in the inventory of a number of states is fully realistic." Tacit support for these claims has been provided by key Los Alamos weapons designers who have conducted research on pure-fusion devices. One of the "number of states" mentioned by Maslin that will not have pure-fusion devices in the foreseeable future is the United States. They are forbidden by U.S. law - strange but true. No other nation has imposed such a restriction on itself. As of today, the only nuclear-weapon capability the United States has is strategic. After the Persian Gulf War, President Bush ordered the destruction of all U.S. battlefield nuclear weapons; moreover, Congress has made sure we won't get any more by prohibiting the development and production of new tactical weapons. But Russia still has thousands of these weapons and now is placing primary emphasis on their use to make up for the severe shortcomings of its conventional forces. And China, which now has the neutron bomb, can be expected to build up a significant battlefield nuclear capability. All of which places the United States in a very precarious position should it become involved in a large-scale ground war with these two countries. The result is that we have a very large stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons based on fission, but no strategy to affect the outcome of a confrontation with a nation using low-yield fusion nuclear weapons, short of nuclear annihilation. The dilemma is that, in a situation where our supreme national interests might be at stake, the only military option available to our leaders would be to "blow up the world" by using our stockpile of high-yield thermonuclear weapons - or to give way to a determined opponent.

Aff—CTBT Bad (No Verification→ No Security)**The CTBT isn't Verifiable—The Result Will be Others Cheating and a Decline in American Security**

Baker Spring, research fellow, "The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: In Arms Control's Worst Tradition," BACKGROUNDER n. 1332, Heritage Foundation, 10—7—99, www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1332.cfm, accessed 7-20-09.

The CTBT, which bans nuclear test explosions no matter how small their yields, is also unverifiable. Low-yield underground tests are very difficult to detect with the seismic monitors used to verify compliance with the test ban. In past administrations, CTBT negotiations focused on fashioning an agreement that allowed explosions below a certain threshold because it is impossible to verify explosions below those levels. This was confirmed in recent articles in The Washington Post and The Washington Times, which reported on speculation in the intelligence community that Russia may have conducted a clandestine nuclear test on September 8, 1999. 4 The inability of the intelligence community to make a determined judgment makes clear the impossibility of verifying adherence to the CTBT. In understanding the implications of the CTBT's lack of verifiability, the Senate should consider the problems with verifying the BWC. Iraq, for example, not only built a biological arsenal in defiance of its BWC obligations, but years of intrusive inspections by the United Nations after Iraq's defeat in the Persian Gulf War failed to give a full accounting of Iraq's biological weapons programs. 5 The lack of effective verification also allowed the Soviet Union to violate the BWC at will. 6 Although Russian President Boris Yeltsin has renounced the biological weapons program Russia inherited from the Soviet Union in 1992, suspicions that Russia is continuing that program remain. 7 Even the Clinton Administration, a fervent supporter of the BWC, acknowledges that the BWC is flawed. The 1997 annual report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency noted, "Over the two decades since entry-into-force of the BWC, confidence in the effectiveness of the [BWC] has been undermined by instances of non-compliance, notably on the part of the former Soviet Union and Iraq." 8 The "zero-yield" feature of the CTBT will compound the verification problems found in the BWC. As wrongheaded as the BWC is in terms of ignoring the standard of verifiability, at least it leaves no illusion that other countries could cheat. But the CTBT represents an attempt to deceive the American people and the Senate concerning verification because it includes an elaborate "verification" regime. The inherent lack of true verifiability in the CTBT is all but certain to result in cheating, which will undermine U.S. security just as Soviet and Iraqi cheating under the BWC jeopardizes U.S. security. In the CTBT's case, however, the problem is made much more severe because its "verification" regime will create the illusion that no violations occur because cheaters will be caught. The "absence of evidence" that a clandestine test has occurred will be treated as "evidence of [the] absence" of cheating. 9 Illusion is a dangerous commodity in the area of national security. When it involves weapons as powerful as nuclear weapons, illusion can easily lead to widespread destruction.